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No Longer the Ugly Duckling: The European Court
of Human Rights Recognizes Transsexual Civil
Rights in Goodwin v. United Kingdom and Sets the
Tone for Future United States Reform
What pulls human rights forward is not a series of separate,
parallel cords, but a "rope" of multiple interwoven strands.
Remove one strand, and the entire rope is weakened.
International human rights law is a strand woven throughout
the length of the rope. Its main value is not how much rights
protection it can pull as a single strand, but in how it
strengthens the entire rope.'
INTRODUCTION: THE DUCKLING OFrEN HIDES BEHIND HIS WING
Goodwin v. United Kingdom2 held that the United Kingdom's
refusal to allow transsexuals the right to change their official birth
certificates and the right to obtain valid marriages was in violation of
Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Decided by the European
Court of Human Rights in July 2002, the case involved a male to
female transsexual who sued the United Kingdom because of the
government's refusal to allow her to change her official birth
certificate and to get legally married. Overturning years of prior
transsexual civil rights case law, the Court reinterpreted Articles 8
and 12 in the light of present day conditions and held that the United
Kingdom must establish procedures to correct those violations and
must begin extending civil rights to transsexuals immediately.
The holding in Goodwin will definitely impact birth recordation
and marriage procedures in the United Kingdom. More importantly,
however, the Goodwin holding may usher in a new wave of sexual
minority civil rights litigation in the United States. If so, domestic
courts could consider Goodwin persuasive authority when deciding
transsexual civil rights litigation in an effort to increase judicial
globalization. They should do so because the European Court is an
internationally well-respected tribunal that is dedicated to
adjudicating human rights issues; it would be an appropriate authority
for domestic courts to consider when deciding transsexual civil rights
in the states. Transsexuals in the United States who wish to amend
their birth certificates or get legally married should consider using the
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. Douglass Cassell, Does Human Rights Law Make a Difference? 2 Chi. J.
Int'l. L. 121, 123 (2001), available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
2. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002).
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Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for those rights. Finally, they
should also consider basing their claims of rights on the opinions of
Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut and Justice Blackmun
in Bowers v. Hardwick to argue that the Ninth Amendment
guarantees to them the same rights guaranteed to their European
brethren under Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.
The recency and modernness of the Goodwin decision have
brought transsexual civil rights into the public eye; therefore, the note
suggests a couple of ideas based upon Goodwin that might make it
easier for United States transsexuals to have the same civil rights as
European transsexuals. Section I presents the facts of Goodwin v.
United Kingdom. Section II examines the law that gave rise to the
Goodwin decision, including Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention and
prior European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Section HI
discusses the evolution in thejudicial interpretation of the articles that
enabled the Court to reach the Goodwin decision. Section IV
speculates upon the implications this decision will have upon
European law and administrative practices. Then, Section V brings
Goodwin closer to home, analyzing its potential effects on domestic
courts and on transsexual litigants fighting for human rights in the
states.
A. Vocabulary
Before presenting Goodwin v. United Kingdom, it is necessary to
define specific terms used to describe transsexuals and review the
history of the condition. In a four year period beginning in 1987,
Holly Devor, author of Female to Male Transsexuals in Society, met
and personally interviewed forty-five female to male transsexuals.
She developed a vocabulary of relevant terms used in association with
transsexuals. Her definitions serve as the basis of the vocabulary
used throughout this note.' "Sex" refers to the physiological status of
a person, whether defined by chromosomes, external genitalia, or
hormones.4 "Gender" or "gender identity" refers to the social status
of a person, such as man or woman.' "Female to male transsexual"
or "male to female transsexual" are phrases used to describe persons
who have begun to identify themselves as transsexual or who are in
the process of transforming their genders or sexes.6 Transsexuals
could be described as having a gender identity that more closely
matches the other physical sex and they often describe themselves as
3. Holly Devor, Female to Male Transsexuals in Society xxvii (Indiana
University Press 1997).
4. Id. at xxiv.
5. id.
6. Id. at xxv.
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feeling trapped in the body of the wrong sex.' "Transgendered" is
used to describe persons who have bodies of one sex, but who regard
themselves as either partly or completely members of the opposite
gender; however, they do not experience the desire to surgically alter
their anatomy through sex reassignment.'
B. History and Causes of Transgenderism/Transsexualism
It is estimated that one in 10,000-12,000 males and one in 30,000
females are transsexual.' Evidence of transgenderism goes as far
back as descriptions in classical Greek and Roman mythology. There
are documented stories of women living as men in Medieval Europe,
as well as in the Renaissance."0 The eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries similarly featured women cross-dressing as men in order to
obtain economic advantages that they could not achieve as women."
The 1950's saw the beginning of systematic medical treatment for
transsexuals, and the first gender clinics opened in the mid 1960's.' In
1976, Renee Richards, a popular professional tennis player,
announced the results of her successful gender reassignment surgery.
By then, transsexualism was no longer seriously questioned as a
medical condition. In 1979, it was dubbed "gender dysphoria" by the
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association. 2
Today the term preferred by ?rofessionals to describe the condition
is "gender identity disorder.'
The history oftransgenderism/transsexualism is much clearer than
its causes, for there is much debate among theorists as to whether the
condition is psychologically or biologically based. 4 On one hand,
many believe that transsexualism is a reaction to anxieties about
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id.
9. Vanessa Baird, The No-Nonsense Guide to Sexual Diversity 127 (New
Internationalist Publications Ltd. 2001), citing Judith McKay, The Penguin Atlas
of Human Sexual Behavior (Penguin 2000). Estimates of the range of the
population with the condition vary widely, with some studies placing the range from
three to five percent and others placing it from eight to ten percent. Lynne Carroll,
Paula J. Gilroy, & Jo Ryan, Counseling transgendered, transsexual, and gender-
variant clients, 80 Journal of Counseling and Development: JCD 131-39 (2002).
10. Devor, supra note 3, at 9-10. Consider St. Joan of Arc, a famous gender
rebel.
11. Id. at 19.
12. Sister Mary Elizabeth, SSE, Legal Aspects of Transsexualism, at
http://www-genderweb.org/legal/jZcp 1.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
13. Carroll, Gilroy, Ryan, supra note 9. Although professionals have long
used these terms to describe the condition, many in the transgender community have
rejected the use of such terms because they feel as though the terms are
dehumanizing.
14. Devor, supra note 3, at 37.
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one's gender role or that it is the result of over identification with the
parent of the opposite sex.15 On the other hand, some theorists
believe that transsexualism may have biological origins.
Unfortunately, the question of whether or not transsexualism is
genetically based has not been systematically investigated. Most of
the biological theories focus on the influence of hormones on the
endocrine and brain system.' 6  One such theory espoused by
researchers in the Netherlands involves the hypothalamus, which is
a dense collection of neurons located in the brain. This organ secretes
hormones in response to stimuli that causes endocrine gland
reactions. The proponents of this theory claim that the bed nucleus
of the stria terminalis (BST) is larger in men than in women. These
researchers assert that transsexuals are born with a BST size that does
not correspond to their physical gender. They base their theory on the
finding of female size BST's in male-to-female transsexuals. This
theory implies that gender identity develops as a result of an
interaction between the developing brain and sex hormones.' 7
Transsexuals have a richly documented history and are the subject
of extensive medical testing as well as psychiatric and sociological
debate. However, an argument can be made that socially transsexuals
are not accepted as a group. Around the world, most sexual
minorities face such forms of persecution as unfair arrest, beatings,
torture, rape, discrimination in the workplace, loss of employment,
invasion of privacy, and in some countries, even execution.' As a
result of the ostracization they face, transsexuals can be compared to
the main character in a well-known Hans Christian Andersen fairy
tale. 9 In The Ugly Duckling, an ugly duckling was hatched by a
mother duck and reared among her other ducklings. As a result of his
differences, the duckling was picked on and driven away from the rest
of the flock. One day, he overheard a strange sound; children were
admiring him. After he looked at his reflection in a pond, he realized
that he had matured into a beautiful swan. 0
There are some similarities between transsexuals as a sexual
minority group and the tale of the ugly duckling. Transsexuals are
often misunderstood and driven away from mainstream society
15. Id. at 53.
16. Id. at 65.
17. Id. at 62.
18. Baird, supra note 9, at 17, 173. In Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Mauritania, Yemen, and Sudan, homosexuality is a capital offense.
19. This comparison is not meant to offend or belittle transsexuals. The tale
was chosen not only because is it a well-known story, but also because of the
surprising similarity is has to the social situation faced by transsexuals in society,
at least in the author's view.
20. Hans Christian Andersen, The Ugly Duckling (Jerry Pinkney adapt.,
Morrow Junior Books 1999).
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because of their perceived differences. Just like the duckling was not
considered ugly for long, though, society's perception of transsexuals
may be changing as well. If courts in the United States adopt the
reasoning behind the Goodwin decision, there is evidence that a
happy ending may finally be in store to end the transsexual
community's fight for civil rights recognition.
I. THE DUCKLING iS No LONGER UGLY:
GOOD WIN v. UNITED KINGDOM 2
Christine Goodwin was born a man. She was diagnosed a
transsexual in the mid 1960s. Before her sex reassignment surgery,
she married a woman and had four children. Although from that
point on she dressed as a man for work, she dressed as a woman in
her free time.22 In the mid 1980s, Goodwin started living as a woman
in earnest. Beginning with regular psychiatric sessions, Goodwin
began hormone therapy, grooming classes, voice training, and surgery
to shorten her vocal chords. In 1990, the National Health Service in
the United Kingdom provided and paid for Goodwin's gender
reassignment surgery.23
Goodwin claimed that she experienced discrimination and a
denial of rights almost immediately after the surgery. She attempted
to file suit for sexual harassment she claimed to have experienced in
the workplace, but she was denied her claim because she was still
considered a man. She believed that as a result of her surgery, she
was eventually dismissed from her old job. At her new place of
employment, she was required to furnish her National Insurance
number to her employer, but she knew that anyone who had access to
the number could find out her previous sex. Concerned about the
repercussions of such a disclosure, Goodwin applied to receive a new
insurance number. Once her peers stopped speaking to her, she
inferred that her employer had discovered the truth about her past.24
The DSS Contributions Agency informed Goodwin that her status
as a postoperative female was not enough to entitle her to begin
receiving her pension at the age of sixty as all other women could. 5
Instead, she would have to continue contributing to the pension plan
21. There is also a companion case to Goodwin, I v. UK, 2 F.C.R. 613 (2002),
decided on the same day, July 11, 2002. This case similarly dealt with a male to
female transsexual who appealed to the European Court of Human Rights for relief
based on an alleged denial of Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention. The Court's
decisions in the two cases are virtually identical.
22. 35Eur. Ct.H.R. 18at455.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 456.
25. Id. at 459. This is the organization that administers pension procedures in
the United Kingdom.
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as men do until the age of sixty-five because she was still considered
a man by the Contributions Agency. Goodwin accepted this and
worked out a deal with the Agency by which she paid her
contributions directly to them. She paid this way because she was
afraid of being singled out by her employers and co-workers. Her
records still identified her as a man, but were now marked
"sensitive." This designation meant that the files could only be
accessed by a particular employee group. As a result, any dealings
she undertook with the Agency required special appointments even
for the simplest of concerns.26 Because of her status, Goodwin felt
unable to partake in any of the benefits of life that required her to
produce a birth certificate such as obtaining fuel allowances,
mortgage refinancing, or loans. Goodwin was so afraid of the
repercussions that she might face if her past was disclosed that she
did not even report a theft of money to the authorities.2 7
Goodwin became tired of dealing with what she considered to be
inequitable treatment at the hands of the government. She decided to
petition for a hearing before the European Court of Human Rights.
She cited violations of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union for not being able to change her official gender on
her birth certificate and for not being able to get legal recognition of
her marriage. Specifically, she sought relief under Article 8 and
Article 12 guaranteeing the right of respect for private life and the
right to marry, respectively. She asserted that dynamic changes were
taking place in the law with respect to transsexual rights in Europe
and elsewhere and argued that transsexuals were gaining more social
acceptance as was evidenced by the media coverage allotted to them.
She prayed for pecuniary damages that totaled the pension she had
been unable to claim since age sixty and the bus pass that she was
unable to obtain as a result of not being eligible to draw her pension.
She prayed for non pecuniary damages to compensate her for distress,
anxiety, and humiliation.28
The United Kingdom countered that no violation of Article 8 had
occurred since no standard approach among the member states of the
Union existed with respect to treatment of transsexuals. It further
asserted that she suffered no practical disadvantage as the result of her
treatment at the hands of the government. Further, notwithstanding
the sensitive designation given her files, the government asserted that
she was still able to obtain the documents she needed that identified
her as a woman.29 It claimed that nothing could be done regarding her
26. Id. at 456.
27. Id.
28. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 482.
29. Id. at 469.
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pension because pension benefits were determined by a retiree's
biological gender at birth. Finally, the United Kingdom argued that
adequate protection was available to her for her sexual harassment
claims. It argued that she could have instituted a criminal action for
harassment and assault or could have brought an action under the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975.3° The European Court of Human Rights
disagreed, however, and responded to Goodwin's claims by
overturning fifty years of prior transsexual civil rights jurisprudence.
The Court found that Goodwin had been denied her civil rights under
Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The Convention). '
PART 11. THE PATH TO BEAUTY: INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 8
AND 12 AND PREVIOUS TRANSSEXUAL CIVIL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was entered into force on September 3, 1953,
by the member states of the Council of Europe.32 The Convention sets
forth a catalogue of human rights and creates an intricate enforcement
mechanism to permit individuals and groups to file complaints against
their national government through the European Court of Human
Rights. 33 The European Court of Human Rights was formed to enforce
the human rights protected by the Convention.34 Two of those rights
include the right of privacy and the right of marriage, which are
enumerated in Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home, and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as in accordance with the law and as necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
30. Id. at 470.
31. Id. at 482.
32. P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European
Convention on Human Rights 2 (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers 1984).
Presently there are forty-five member states.
33. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int'l L. 1103, 1109
(2000).
34. van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 32, at 19.
35. J.E.S. Fawcett, Application of the European Convention on Human Rights
210 (Oxford University Press 1987) (1969).
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Article 12 provides that "Men and women of marriageable age have
the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national
laws governing the exercise of this right. 3 6
Prior to Goodwin, transsexuals brought suits claiming violations
of Articles 8 and 12, but the European Court of Human Rights often
did not find violations of the rights embodied in the articles because
of the way that the articles had traditionally been interpreted. For
example, Corbett v. Corbett was an early case that involved
transsexual civil rights.37 Even though this case did not involve
claimed violations of Articles 8 and 12 and was decided by the
Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the United Kingdom, it
is important because its reasoning was adopted by the European Court
of Human Rights in subsequent cases. In Corbett, a postoperative
male to female transsexual married her husband after having gender
altering surgery. The husband, who had been aware of the surgery,
eventually petitioned for divorce. He claimed that the marriage was
null since its inception because his wife was biologically a man and
that the marriage was never consummated because of his wife's
incapacity.38 The Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division reasoned
that the main issue in the case centered on the determination of
whether the wife was in fact a woman.
To determine if the wife would be considered female for the
purpose of marriage, the court first held that it would not use the
presence or absence of a penis to determine gender. Also, the court
held that the biological sexual constitution of an individual was fixed
at birth and could not be changed either by natural development of
organs of the opposite sex or by surgical methods.39 It then relied
upon the testimony of various doctors and experts to establish a four
factor test consisting of chromosomal, gonadal, genital, and
psychological attributes.4" Applying this test, the court found the
chromosomal evidence classified the wife as a man because she had
the requisite XY chromosomes. Based on gonadal evidence, the court
found that the wife had been a man because she did have testicles.
Next, the court looked at the genital evidence and also found that the
wife had been a man due to the penis she had before its removal.
Finally, the court studied psychological evidence and found that the
wife had been properly classified a transsexual.4' Even though the
court considered the four factored test, however, it decided that it
36. Id. at 285.
37. Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 Probate Reports 83.
38. Id. at 85.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id. at 100.
41. Id. at 104.
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NOTES
would only rely upon the chromosomal, gonadal, and genital
attributes in order to determine the wife's sex for the purposes of
marriage. Since those three tests revealed that the wife was a man,
the court held that the wife was a biological male and hence the
marriage was void since its inception.4
2
After Corbett, transsexuals began to argue for civil rights in a
different court under a new theory. Litigants decided to petition the
European Court of Human Rights for relief by claiming their Article
8 and 12 rights had been violated. Rees v. United Kingdom, one of
the first such cases, was decided in 1986 and was brought by a female
to male transsexual against the United Kingdom. The litigant claimed
that the government's refusal to alter his birth certificate to reflect his
postoperative status amounted to a denial of his civil rights under
Articles 8 and 12. Although he was able to obtain a new passport
and have all other official documents (e.g., driving license, car
registration, national insurance card, medical card, and electoral poll)
changed, he was not able to convince the Registrar General to alter
the Register." Using the chromosomal, gonadal, and genital factors
laid out in the Corbett case, the Registrar determined that the litigant
was born a woman and hence his birth certificate would continue to
reflect that he was a woman. Rees then petitioned the European
Court of Human Rights for relief.
In determining if there was compliance with Article 8, the Court
first reasoned that the essential purpose of the article was to protect
individuals against arbitrary interference by the authorities. The
Court noted that Article 8 imposed a positive obligation on the
government to show respect for the private lives of its citizens.45 The
essential issue in the case was whether the refusal to allow the litigant
to alter his birth certificate was an interference with his private life
and whether the government had a positive obligation to allow such
an alteration. In order to decide this issue, it held that a fair balance
between the rights of the individual and the general interests of the
community had to be struck.46 In conducting this balancing test, the
Court stated that the United Kingdom, while affording transsexuals
the opportunity to change their names for various legal purposes,
should not be required to introduce a new system for amending birth
certificates. It felt that this would impose new duties on the
government that were unnecessary, such as the development of a
national system of birth registration amendment, the development of
a method of keeping annotations private from third parties, and the
42. Id. at 106.
43. 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (1987).
44. Id. at 58.
45. Id. at 60.
46. Id. at 64.
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passing of extensive legislation to provide for all of the necessary
recordation adjustments required.47 Therefore, the Court decided the
United Kingdom's positive obligations did not include the
government having to establish a system that showed proof of current
civil status.4"
The Court next turned to the alleged violation of Article 12. It
said that the right to marry as guaranteed by Article 12 referred to the
traditional definition of marriage, which was understood to occur
between persons of opposite biological sex.49 The Court justified this
interpretation by construing Article 12 to be a protection of marriage
as the basis for family. Further, the Court held that the exercise of the
right to marry as guaranteed by Article 12 was subject to the law of
the United Kingdom, which did not recognize marriage between
persons of the same biological sex.5° Therefore, the Court considered
the litigant's marriage to be invalid. Rees was unsuccessful in his
attempt to prove governmental violations of Articles 8 and 12.
Rees ushered in a new era of litigation involving the extent of
transsexual rights under Articles 8 and 12. In 1990, a male to female
postoperative transsexual brought yet another suit against the United
Kingdom, once again alleging a denial of her Article 8 and 12 rights.
Cossey v. United Kingdom involved a litigant who alleged that the
government violated her civil rights because it failed to grant her a
new birth certificate and refused to allow her to legally marry a man.5'
The European Court of Human Rights agreed to rehear the issue as an
opportunity to ascertain whether it should adopt a different
construction of Articles 8 and 12 as applied to transsexual civil rights.
The Court first interpreted Article 8 by referencing its decision in
the Rees case. Finding the litigant's situation here similar to the
litigant in Rees, the Court determined Rees applied, and a novel issue
was not before it.52 It did not find that the government's refusal to
provide Cossey with a new birth certificate constituted an interference
with her private life. Recognizing that what she was actually arguing
was that the government had a positive obligation to modify its
existing birth registration system, the Court placed great weight on
the fact that the existing system served as repository of historical data.
As such, it held that the government had a valid concern in preventing
the falsification of birth records to prevent persons with legitimate
interests in such data from being misled.53 Under the facts presented,
47. Id. at 66.
48. Id.
49. Rees, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68.
50. Id.
51. 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 622, 629 (1991).
52. Id. at 633.
53. Id. at 632.
652 [Vol. 64
the Court concluded that a new interpretation of Article 8 was not
warranted and hence refused to alter its earlier interpretation of the
article.
The Court's interpretation of Article 12 mirrored its interpretation
of Article 8, for once again the Rees decision was referenced.5 4
Although the Court stressed that Article 12 did not call for the
exclusive use of a biological test to determine a person's sex for the
purpose of marriage, it claimed that there was no evidence of any
general abandonment of the traditional concept of marriage. Although
the Court recognized that some contracting states of the Council of
Europe would recognize her right to validly marry a man, it did not
consider itself open to take a new approach to the interpretation of
Article 12. Holding that the law of the contracting state applied, the
Court considered the criteria adopted by English law for marriage and
found that the criteria conformed with the concept of marriage
guaranteed by Article 12.55 Taking these determinations into account,
the Court found that there was no United Kingdom violation of Article
12. Even after a rehearing on the issue, the Court was still unwilling to
find that transsexuals were being denied their civil rights.
In B. v. France, the Court again decided to revisit the issue of
transsexual civil rights under Articles 8 and 12; however, in B., it
became clear that the Court's interpretation of the articles would not be
the same for each of the contracting states of the Convention.5 6 In B.,
the Court showed its willingness to adapt its interpretation of Articles
8 and 12 to the differences in the national laws of each of the
contracting states. This willingness foreshadowed what was soon to
become an entirely new approach to the judicial construction of those
articles. The litigant was a male to female transsexual who sued the
French government for its failure to recognize her postoperative
gender. Like her predecessors, she claimed the French government
violated Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.57 She alleged that she
was being denied civil rights because the number issued to her by the
National Statistics and Economic Research Institute officially showed
her as a man.58 Because of this, she claimed that simple everyday
activities like paying a check, collecting a letter, cashing a postal order,
or voting were hampered by the French government's refusal to
recognize her as a woman.
This time, the European Court of Human Rights was receptive to
the litigant's pleas. First, the Court considered its prior decision in
54. Id. at 641.
55. Id. at 642.
56. 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1993).
57. Id. at 12. B.'s Article 12 claims were dismissed by the European Court of
Human Rights for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
58. Id. at 13.
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Rees to determine if an Article 8 violation had occurred. The
litigant successfully persuaded the Court that its main objections to
birth registration amendment as stated in Rees were not applicable
to her case. The first main objection that the Rees court had-that
it would be too much of a burden to require the United Kingdom to
create and implement a system of birth registration
amendment-was not applicable because unlike the system in the
United Kingdom, the French registration system could amend birth
status more easily. The French system already permitted
annotations to be made to the civil status register and access to that
information was strictly regulated; there would be no further burden
placed on the French government if transsexuals were allowed to
annotate the register to reflect their changed gender.59 Further, the
Rees Court's second objection to birth registration
amendment-that transsexuals' preexisting right to adopt a new
name was sufficient because it could be used on most official
documents-also did not apply to the litigant in B. because in
France transsexuals were not as free to adopt a new forename.'
This inability made it much harder for transsexuals to convincingly
live according to their postoperative genders. The litigant used the
differences between the two nations' practices to argue to the Court
that the reasons for their former reticence to find a violation of
Article 8 simply did not apply to her case.
Considering the strength of all of her arguments, the Court in B.
acknowledged that the litigant was subject to more suffering during
her daily life because all her official documents still identified her
as a male, which forced her to reveal her past to third persons
almost on a day-to-day basis.6 It held that she faced particularly
trying ordeals as a result of the discrepancy created between her
appearance as a female, but listed gender on identity papers as a
male. The Court recognized that there were significant factual
differences between its past jurisprudence and B. as a result of the
contrasting ways that the United Kingdom and France handled birth
registration amendments and changes of name for official purposes.
Although it was not willing to overrule Rees or Cossey, it did hold
that a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the
state had not been attained; therefore, the Court found a violation of
Article 8.62 Because the state refused to acknowledge a decisive
component of the litigant's gender identity and did not provide the
59. Id. The birth register was able to be updated to reflect acknowledgment of
an illegitimate child, adoption, marriage, divorce, and death.
60. Id.
61. 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32.
62. id. at 2.
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litigant with practical and effective protection of her private life, the
Court required that the French government take positive steps to
rectify the situation.63
Ill. FROM DUCKLING TO SWAN: REINTERPRETING ARTICLES 8 AND
12 IN GOODWIN V. UNITED KINGDOM
The European Court of Human Rights was not ready to construe
Articles 8 and 12 so as to give them their full legal effect in its prior
transsexual civil rights jurisprudence; but, in Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, both Articles 8 and 12 were found to have been violated.
The reason that the Court was finally willing to afford civil rights to
transsexuals was because the judicial construction given to Articles
8 and 12 changed radically. Before completely reinterpreting the
articles, the Goodwin Court reaffirmed its duty to maintain a dynamic
and evolutive approach to the Convention and recognized that failure
to do so would bar reform or improvement. 64 It explicitly stated that
the Convention was adopted primarily for the protection of human
rights. As the premier authority on interpreting Convention articles,
the Court recognized that it had a corresponding duty to regard
changing social conditions and to respond to those conditions
accordingly. Further, the Court emphasized that it was necessary for
it to interpret the Convention in a manner so as to render the human
rights protected by the articles practical and effective, not theoretical
and illusory.65
A. Article 8 Analysis
The Goodwin Court first analyzed Article 8 in light of the
obligations that the United Kingdom owed to its citizens. The
Court's prior jurisprudence had consistently held that under United
Kingdom law, the government had no positive obligation to change
birth registrations to reflect the altered gender of transsexuals. The
fact that the United Kingdom was not perceived as having a positive
obligation to provide for a system of amendment was not considered
as having an adverse effect on transsexuals nor was it considered a
violation of transsexual's civil rights. The Court in Goodwin,
however, reevaluated the United Kingdom's obligations to
transsexuals in the light of present day conditions. The Court stated
that the conflict that resulted between social reality and law invoked
feelings of vulnerability, humiliation, and anxiety in transsexuals. It
63. Id. at 21.
64. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 448.
65. Id.
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considered Goodwin's personal situation as a transsexual and held
that her position in society versus her status as conferred by law
created stress and alienation that resulted in serious interference -with
her private life in violation of Article 8.66
Second, the Court considered whether the United Kingdom's
existing administrative procedures were in compliance with Article
8. It noted that although there was still no conclusive proof as to the
cause of transsexualism, there was growing international recognition
of the condition and treatment available for it. Medically, the United
Kingdom's National Health Service would provide and pay for
gender reassignment surgery. But legally, transsexuals were still not
given full recognition because they could not officially change the
gender on their birth certificates.67 In Goodwin, the Court
emphasized the importance of coherence between a state's
administrative and legal systems. It found dispositive the fact that the
condition had become so accepted that the United Kingdom would
pay for sex reassignment procedures, but would not afford the
recipients of the operations protection at law. Coherence between the
systems was not being achieved, contributing to a lack of compliance
with Article 8. The Court held that Article 8 allowed transsexuals the
right to officially modify their birth certificate genders in order to
harmonize the administrative procedures that provided for treatment
and surgery for transsexuals with their legal status.
The Court then discussed whether any European and international
consensus existed regarding the application of Article 8 to civil rights
treatment for the transsexual community. In Rees, before ultimately
refusing to recognize a violation of Article 8, the Court gave great
weight to the fact that little common ground existed between the
member states on providing legal recognition to transsexuals
following their gender reassignment. But, in Goodwin, the Court
instead decided to observe the international trend in favor of
increased social acceptance and legal recognition of transsexuals.68
It reasoned that, even though there was no uniformity among the
member states about the extent of legal recognition for transsexuals,
a lack of consensus could not serve as a basis for not extending civil
rights to transsexuals. It acknowledged that it was up to each member
state to decide how to secure Convention rights; however, it also
reaffirmed the Court's duty to decide exactly what those rights were.
Just because the United Kingdom did not have a method in law to
recognize transsexual civil rights did not mean that those rights did
not exist, nor did it mean that those rights were not protected because
66. Id. at 472.
67. Id. at 473.
68. Id. at 475.
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there was no uniform legal theory among all the states of the
Convention. The Goodwin Court stated that in the future, decisions
interpreting Article 8 would attach less importance to the lack of
consensus among the states since it was up to the contracting states
to decide upon measures necessary to secure Convention rights within
their jurisdiction anyway. 69
The next factor the Court analyzed to interpret Article 8 was the
historical nature of the birth register recordation system in the United
Kingdom. In both Rees and Cossey, the Court stated that for purposes
of birth registration, the historical nature of the system required that
a person's recorded gender be the one at the time of birth. In the
United Kingdom, a birth certificate could be changed due to an error
bythe Registrar in recording aperson's original birth status; however,
changing a transsexual's official gender because of subsequent sex
reassignment was not considered to be fixing a recording error.
Instead, such a change constituted falsification of the public records
that could detrimentally affect third persons relying on the register.70
After considering the stance that it had taken in the prior
jurisprudence, the Goodwin Court looked to present day conditions
and found that there was no evidence that third persons would be
detrimentally affected if annotations were made to the birth register
recordation system.7' Further, it stated that the birth records were
already frequently being updated in several situations, including
legitimizations and adoptions.72 Since some changes were already
being made to the system, the Court reasoned that extending to
transsexuals the right to change the register would not pose a threat
of overturning the whole system, nor would it undermine the historic
function of the register. The Court did note that some difficulties
would arise in order to make the birth registration system more
accommodating to transsexuals, but it stated that no concrete or
substantial hardship to thepublic had been demonstrated in relation
to the proposed changes.7' Therefore, the Court no longer saw a
tremendous burden placed on the birth registration system if
transsexuals were allowed the right to alter their original birth
certificates. In order to strike a balance between the individual and
the state, the Court now found that it was reasonable for society to
tolerate certain inconveniences while adjustments were made to the
birth register system so as to allow transsexual individuals the right
to live in dignity in the sexual identity that they chose.74
69. Id.
70. Rees, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66; Cossey, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 632.
71. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 451.
72. Id. at 476.
73. Id. at451.
74. Id. at 477.
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The final factor considered by the Goodwin Court in its Article 8
interpretation was the biological criteria that had traditionally been
used to determine the legal status of transsexuals for the purpose of
birth registration. Past case law relied primarily on the chromosomal,
genital, and gonadal tests as elaborated in Corbett to determine sex
for the purposes of birth recordation." With respect to Article 8, the
Goodwin Court recognized that the principal unchanging element of
gender identity is chromosomal and that transsexuals could not
acquire all the biological characteristics of their acquired sex; but, it
also stated that chromosomal irregularities do occur that often result
in people having to be assigned a gender on the basis of their
individual circumstances rather than on the basis of their genetic
makeup.76 As a result, the Court decided that the chromosomal
element would no longer be relied upon as the sole basis for
disallowing transsexuals the ability to modify the birth register.77
B. Article 12 Analysis
The chromosomal, genital, and gonadal tests had traditionally
been used by the courts to determine sex for the purpose of marriage.
Earlier decisions consistently held that Article 12 referred to the
definition of marriage as a basis for family between a man and a
woman.7" For example, the Corbett Court had interpreted "marriage"
under Article 12 to mean a relationship that depended upon biological
sex, not gender.79 Further, the Court's earlier decisions also
interpreted the Article 12 right to marry as being subject to the law of
the contracting state, which had the power to adopt biological criteria
to determine a person's sex for the purpose of marriage. Its older
jurisprudence emphasized that United Kingdom law recognized
marriage between persons of opposite sex as the basis for family.
Following that line of reasoning, the Court had held that since
transsexuals were not born their postoperative gender and were not
capable of creating a family, they were not allowed to obtain a valid
marriage under United Kingdom law."°
The Goodwin Court drastically reinterpreted Article 12. It refused
to only consider the biological factors when determining the extent of
legal recognition due to transsexuals, reiterating the same conclusions
75. 1971 P. 83 at 106.
76. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 450. Gender would have to be assigned in the case
of a person born with an intersexed condition where the biological criteria at birth
were not congruent. Id. at 474.
77. Id. at 474.
78. Id. at 479.
79. 1971 P. 83 at 107.
80. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 479.
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cited for its refusal to solely consider biological factors in its earlier
discussion of Article 8. The Court would not determine sex for the
purposes of marriage based upon the biological criteria alone.
Instead, the Court stated that determining sex for that purpose should
depend on a multitude of factors that would be assessed at the time of
the marriage.81 The Court then construed Articles 8 and 12 together
to determine if the recordation of the birth sex of transsexuals on the
birth record was a limitation on the very essence of their right to
marry. It found that transsexuals' right to marry would be impaired
if the sexes on their birth certificates remained as the ones that they
were born. If the registration system remained unchanged,
transsexuals would be free to marry a person of their former opposite
sex, but not be free to marry a person whose sex was opposite to
theirs after their sex reassignment surgery.82 Therefore, the Goodwin
Court stated that the terms "man" and "woman" would no longer be
defined based on biological criteria alone and that the inability of a
couple to conceive a child did not automatically restrict their right to
marry under Article 12.
Finally, the Court in Goodwin held that the exercise of the right
to marry was subject to the laws of the United Kingdom. However,
those laws could not restrict the right to marry to such an extent that
the very essence of the right was impaired. In the case of transsexuals
in the United Kingdom, the Court found that the very essence of their
right to marry was impaired by the limitations placed upon them by
the laws of the United Kingdom. The Court concluded its analysis of
Article 12 by stating that there was no justification for the United
Kingdom to bar transsexuals from enjoying the right to marry under
any circumstances.84
In holding that Goodwin did suffer violations under Articles 8 and
12, the Goodwin Court overturned fifty years ofprior transsexual civil
rights jurisprudence.8 In past cases involving the rights guaranteed
by those articles, the European Court of Human Rights had held there
was a margin of appreciation that allowed each state to maintain a
different system of law without contravening the Convention. But in
81. Id. at 480. The other factors listed by the Court included the acceptance of
the condition of gender identity disorder by the medical professions and health
authorities within the contracting states, the provision of treatment including surgery
to assimilate the individual as closely as possible with the gender they believe they
should be, and the assumption by the transsexual of social role of their assigned
gender.
82. Id. at 480.
83. 35Eur. Ct.H.R. 18at479.
84. Id. at 481.
85. Id. at 483. Interestingly, the Court did not award Goodwin her claims for
pecuniary or nonpecuniary damages, holding instead that the findings of the
violations was sufficient just satisfaction.
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Goodwin, the Court found that United Kingdom government officials
could no longer claim that the matter fell within their margin. This
was because even though there was a growing social acceptance of
the condition and a growing recognition of the problems transsexuals
faced, nothing had been done by the United Kingdom to alleviate
those problems. Because the United Kingdom failed to legislate in
that area, all the government was entitled to do was decide the right
means to recognize the rights that the Court now held were protected
by the Convention. 6 Thus, the Goodwin ruling mandates that the
United Kingdom adopt methods to enable transsexuals to modify
their birth certificates and to be legally recognized in their marriages.
IV. LIvING AS A SWAN: IMPLICATIONS OF GOODWINON THE LAWS
OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Effects of Goodwin on European Law
Until the Goodwin decision, the United Kingdom lagged behind
the rest of the member states by allowing private information, such as
gender at birth, to be accessed by the public without a requirement of
clear necessity. 7 Goodwin holds that the United Kingdom must
provide a discrete way for transsexuals to change their birth
certificate records. Now the United Kingdom must determine the
quickest and fairest way to implement Goodwin by establishing a
mechanism for correcting the name and gender details of transsexuals
on the official birth register. Since this ruling will also affect
matrimonial documents, the United Kingdom will also have to decide
upon a method that recognizes marriages between transsexuals as
well.
Since the Goodwin reinterpretation of Article 8 allows
transsexuals the right to change their birth certificates to reflect their
postoperative status, major changes will have to be made to the
existing birth recordation system in the United Kingdom.
Registration of births in the United Kingdom is governed by the
Births and Deaths Registration Act of 1953.8 The birth of every
child is registered by the Registrar of Births and Deaths depending
upon the location of the birth of the child. An entry is a record of
facts at the time of the birth. Part of the entry requires that the sex of
the child be recorded on the certificate but the criteria for determining
the sex of the child is not provided for in the Act. Previously, sex was
86. Id.
87. Arthur Rogers, Legal Implications ofTranssexualism, The Lancet, Apr. 24,
1993, at 1085(2).
88. Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1953, c. 20 § I (Eng.).
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determined by biological criteria consisting of chromosomal, genital,
and gonadal tests. The Act does provide that the Registrar may correct
clerical or factual errors made on the certificate, and formerly, an
amendment could be made only if the error occurred when the birth
was registered. Changes in the initial entry were made in cases in
which the apparent and genital sex were wrongly identified or where
the biological criteria were in conflict.89 Because Goodwin guarantees
to transsexuals the right to officially modify their birth certificates,
provisions will have to be enacted in the United Kingdom to allow for
a system of annotating or amending the birth register. What this
implicitly recognizes is that the psychological test of gender, which was
rejected by the courts for determining the legal status of transsexuals in
Corbett, now has validity. ° That is important because in order for the
United Kingdom to decide a transsexual's gender for legal purposes,
both his psychology and biology will have to be considered by the
government when it makes a gender determination.
The Goodwin ruling that guarantees Article 12 rights to
transsexuals will also have a dramatic effect upon marriages. Under
the Matrimonial Clauses Act of 1973, any marriage in which the parties
were not respectively male and female was void." Corbett held the test
for determining sex for the purpose of marriage was based on the
traditional definition of marriage as a basis for family between a man
and a woman.92 Hence, transsexual marriages were not legally
recognized because of the transsexual member's incapacity to
consummate the marriage during ordinary and complete sexual
intercourse.93 The Goodwin decision no longer recognizes the
aforementioned definition of marriage as the correct definition of
marriage for the purposes of Article 12. Considering that transsexuals
remain biologically the sex that they were born, the Goodwin holding
radically departs from the traditional meaning of marriage recognized
by the United Kingdom. Now the United Kingdom is faced with the
task of determining a method that would allow for legal transsexual
marriages. 94
B. Effect of Goodwin on United States Law?
Goodwin, a controversial matter decided by the European Court
of Human Rights in July 2002, has placed the issue of transsexual
civil rights in the international public eye. Because the European
89. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 458.
90. Corbett, 1971 Probate Reports at 106.
91. Matrimonial Clauses Act, 1973, c. 18 (Eng).
92. 1971 P. 83 at 86.
93. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 at 457.
94. One such method would be to amend the Marriage Act itself.
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Court of Human Rights has recognized civil rights for transsexuals,
it is inevitable that transsexuals in the United States will attempt to
have similar civil rights recognized here. The following discussion
represents only two suggestions that could enable transsexuals in the
United States to have the same civil rights as those abroad. First,
United States courts could become more global in their reasoning
when deciding transsexual civil rights cases. The European Court of
Human Rights is an internationally respected tribunal that was created
to decide human rights issues; it could serve as a very informative
role model for domestic court systems to learn from and imitate in the
area of transsexual civil rights. Also, more United States judges
should follow in the footsteps of some of their own brethren who are
already beginning to look abroad to the decisions of foreign tribunals.
In the spirit of judicial comity, domestic courts could consider
Goodwin persuasive authority if and when they decide cases
regarding transsexual civil rights.
Second, transsexuals in the United States could try to base their
arguments for civil rights on state equal protection clauses as well as
the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. A 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court decision reveals
that state courts might be willing to reinterpret the guarantees
afforded by their respective constitutional equal protection clauses.
A brief overview of the case law involving attempts by sexual
minorities in the United States to have their marriages legally
recognized reveals that in the past they were unsuccessful in basing
their claims under a Fourteenth Amendment privacy theory. Recent
United States Supreme Court case law, however, reveals that the
courts are becoming more amenable to sexual minorities' claims to
civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, transsexuals
should also consider urging the Ninth Amendment as an authority in
support of legal recognition for a transsexual marriage.
1. For United States Courts to Consider: Judicial
Globalization
Society becomes more global in scope each day. Communities
around the world are intertwined both socially and financially largely
because of the growth in technology. Similarly, courts are becoming
linked on an international level as well through the process ofjudicial
globalization. Judicial globalization is the interaction of judiciaries
above, across, and below borders in which courts exchange ideas and
cooperate in cases that involve national and international laws.95 As
courts interact more and more over common issues, they can gain
95. Slaughter, supra note 33, at 1104.
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much from sharing ideas and approaches to the resolution of cases.
This is especially true in the area of civil rights, a topic that has
become more prevalent in disputes brought before tribunals.
The European Court of Human Rights, a prestigious court that is
internationally well-respected, is a prime example of judicial
globalization in action. Because the European Court was specifically
created to resolve human rights concerns, it is an authority in that area
of the law. Therefore, United States courts should consider giving the
European Court's decisions some weight when it resolves civil rights
issues here in the states. Further, over time civil rights protection has
become a more litigated issue in the courts. Since the scope of civil
rights should not be limited by nationality, United States courts could
regard the Goodwin holding by the European Court of Human Rights
as persuasive authority in an effort to become more judicially
globalized and more in sync with the rest of the world with respect to
transsexual civil rights.9
The European Court of Human Rights has controlling jurisdiction
to specifically hear civil rights cases; therefore, it can be more
progressive in its transsexual civil rights jurisprudence and other
similar matters. The European Court in Goodwin reaffirmed its duty
to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach to the law and to see
that the rights guaranteed by the Convention were afforded to all
persons within the member states' jurisdictions. By maintaining a
dynamic approach to the law, the Court was able to adjust its prior
transsexual civil rights rulings to account for changing social mores
and values. It was probably easier for the European Court to
accomplish that than it would have been for a United States court,
because United States courts are not specifically dedicated to hearing
matters that deal exclusively with human rights issues. For this
reason, domestic courts of general jurisdiction should begin to
consider the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as
persuasive authority because the European Court's expertise is in
deciding civil rights cases. This specialization forces it to devote
most of its deliberation, study, and research to human rights concerns.
Thus, there is no better role model than the European Court of Human
Rights for United States Courts to follow when deciding future
transsexual civil rights litigation.
Deference by domestic courts to foreign courts in resolving
transnational disputes is nothing new. In fact, it is a well-known
doctrine known as judicial comity.97 The decisions of the European
Court are not formal authority outside of Europe. However, the
decisions of the Court are afforded great weight worldwide as a result
96. Id. at 1109.
97. Id. at 1112-13.
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of their legitimacy and care and because of the quality of the judges
who make them." Some influential United States judges seem willing
to lend authority to foreign court decisions. For example, some justices
on the United States Supreme Court have begun to consider foreign and
international law in their opinions-a practice strongly advocated by
Justices O'Connor and Breyer. In the very recent case of Lawrence v.
Texas, (discussed in more detail in the next section), the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime
for two persons of the same sex to engage in sodomy while in the
privacy of their home.99 The Court found that Fourteenth Amendment
liberty encompasses homosexual privacy rights and that adverse
precedent in Bowers v. Hardwick was overruled.10 In support of his
argument to overrule Bowers, Justice Kennedy specifically relied upon
the fact that the reasoning in Bowers had been rejected by the European
Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.'0 ' In Printz v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a requirement
of the federally enacted Brady Act, which required local civil servants
to perform background checks on potential firearms purchasers, was
unconstitutional Justice Breyer's dissent suggested that the Court
should consider the experience of foreign courts in resolving the
issue. 3 In Knight v. Florida's dissent, Breyer once again cited thejurisprudence of foreign courts to support his view that delays in
administering the death penalty constituted inhumane treatment under
the Eighth Amendment. 4
Lower federal courts have also considered international law in their
writing judicial opinions. For example, Judge Calabresi of the Second
Circuit has looked abroad to international decisions for the purposes of
learning and cross-fertilization. In United States v. Then, the Second
Circuit held that treating one gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent
of 100 times as much powder cocaine when sentencing a minority
defendant did not offend the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.0 5 In Judge Calabresi's concurrence, he advocated
the German and Italian judicial practice of announcing in opinions
when enacted laws were approaching unconstitutionality on equal
protection grounds. He suggested that United States courts follow the
same approach."0
98. Id. at 1111.
99. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
100. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
101. 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 40 (1981); 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
102. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368 (1997).
103. Id. at 977, 117 S. Ct. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990, 120 S. Ct. 459, 461 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
105. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,466 (2d Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 468-69 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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United States courts should follow the examples of the
modernized judges who already look to authority that has come from
abroad in an effort to be more dynamic and evolutive. Because the
European Court of Human Rights is internationally respected and
well-versed in civil rights issues, it sets the perfect example for
domestic courts to imitate. The decision in Goodwin just may usher
in an era of transsexual civil rights litigation regarding birth
registration amendment and marriage. When and if they decide those
cases, United States courts could look to Goodwin as very persuasive
authority in the spirit of judicial globalization. Thus, the European
Court's decision in Goodwin could provide domestic courts with
additional justification to hold that transsexuals here should have the
same civil rights as those in Europe.
2. For Transsexual Litigants to Consider: Equal Protection,
Privacy, and the Ninth Amendment
Transsexuals in the United States have not been afforded the right
to change the gender on their birth certificates in all states nor have
their marriages been legally recognized in all states. However, recent
state court jurisprudence recognizing the rights of homosexuals to
obtain civil marriages is encouraging. In addition, the Fourteenth
Amendment, traditionally rejected as authority for civil rights for
sexual minorities, has now become an attractive argument upon
which transsexuals could base their claims due to recent United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence. A final argument for the right to
change a birth certificate and the right to get married might be based
upon the Ninth Amendment. Judicial support exists for the
proposition that the Ninth Amendment retains civil rights to sexual
minorities.
Only about one-half of the state and territorial jurisdictions in the
United States have statutes that explicitly provide ways for
postoperative transsexuals to modify their birth certificates to reflect
their new genders. 7 In addition, state court jurisprudence that
specifically involves transsexual marriages has historically been
disappointing. In 1999, the Court of Appeals of Texas held in
Littleton v. Prange that the marriage of a male to female transsexual
to a biological man was not valid and thus the surviving spouse
lacked standing to bring a claim under the state's death and survival
statutes.'0 8 Similarly, Estate of Gardiner, decided by the Supreme
107. Katrina C. Rose, Sign of a Wave? The Kansas Court of Appeals Rejects
Texas Simplicity in Favor of Transsexual Reality, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 257, 259
(2001).
108. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
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Court of Kansas in March 2002, held that a postoperative male to
female transsexual was not a woman within the meaning of Kansas'
marriage statutes. It further held that a marriage between a
postoperative male to female transsexual and a biological male was
void as against public policy.'l°
Existing statutory law reflects that the majority of states permit
marriages only between persons of the opposite sex. "° Similar to the
issue of transsexual marriages, state court jurisprudence regarding
homosexual marriages had also been disappointing until a 2003
Massachusetts Supreme Court decision. In 1993, the Hawaiian
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin announced that laws forbidding
same sex marriage could only be constitutional if supported by a
compelling state interest.' On remand, the trial court held that the
state failed to sustain its burden of proof and hence had to allow
marriage between persons of the same sex."12 In response to the
Hawaiian trial court decision, however, the Hawaiian people adopted
a constitutional provision defining marriage as a relationship between
one man and one woman." 3 Moreover, in 1996, Congress passed the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provides that no state is
required to give legal effect to an Y same-sex marriage performed
under the laws of another state." The passage of DOMA was
obviously a Congressional effort to preclude national recognition of
same sex marriages; however, a recent Massachusetts Supreme Court
case might finally provide transsexuals with some support for their
civil rights claims to obtain valid legal marriages.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health involved seven same-
sex couples desirous of obtaining legally recognized civil marriages
109. Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
110. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons ofSame Sex,
81 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2000). The exception is Vermont's Civil Union Act, Vt. Stat. tit.
15, §§ 1201-03 (2002).
111. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
112. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 at **21-22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
113. But also note that the Hawaiian legislature enacted legislation granting
unmarried couples broad rights and privileges. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Family Law
in Louisiana 20 (Louisiana Practice Series 2003).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2002). Also relevant is the definition of marriage in
the United States Code Annotated, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2002). It reads as follows:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling...
of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. (emphasis added).
It should be noted that a house bill was introduced in January 2001, which proposed
to amend the meaning of marriage in § 7 by eliminating any federal policy on the
definition. H.R. 270, 107th Cong. (2001). Representative Frank introduced the bill
again on July 9, 2003 as H.R. 2677, 108th Cong. (2003).
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under Massachusetts law." 5  The couples expressed wishes to
publicly commit to each other and to secure the legal protections and
benefits afforded married couples and their children. All were denied
marriage licenses by Massachusetts city clerks on the ground that
Massachusetts does not recognize same-sex marriage. 116 The couples
then filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court seeking a judgment
recognizing that exclusion of same-sex couples from access to
marriage licenses violated various Massachusetts constitutional
provisions. The court found that the marriage exclusion did not
offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution but instead furthered the state's interest
in safeguarding the primary purpose of marriage, procreation." 7 On
appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court granted direct appellate
review.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that government action
barring same-sex couples from obtaining civil marriages violated the
Massachusetts Constitution's guarantee of equality." 8 The court
stated that the Massachusetts Constitution was more protective of
individual liberties than that of the federal Constitution. Furthermore,
the court held that the ability to obtain a legal marriage was a
fundamental right. The state had the burden of proving that
governmental action that barred the exercise of that right was a
legitimate exercise of the state's police power. The court found that
the state did not meet this burden.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that by denying same
sex couples the right to marry, those couples were also being denied
benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license. Those benefits
touched upon rights relating to taxes, property, and survival actions.",9
Additionally, the court found that the state's asserted interest in the
welfare of children was better served by allowing same sex couples
to marry. Finally, the court rejected the state's argument that
restricting marriage to opposite sex couples was valid because only
those couples could beget children and the state had a legitimate
interest in providing an optimal setting for procreation. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that because the statute deprived
individuals of access to a fundamental right based solely on a single
trait, sexual orientation, it violated the state constitutional guarantee
of equal protection.'20
115. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
116. Id. at 950.
117. Id. at 951.
118. Id. at 948.
119. Id. at 955.
120. Id. at 959.
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The Littleton and Gardiner decisions illustrate that domestic
state courts have traditionally decided transsexual civil rights cases
more narrowly than the European Court of Human Rights. But, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in Goodridge may provide
a basis for transsexual couples to argue for the right to marry in
states whose constitutions feature equal protection clauses that are
similar to that of Massachusetts.
Historically, courts had not been receptive to sexual minority
claims for civil rights based upon the United State Constitution.
The fact that transsexual civil rights cases are not approached the
same way by United States courts and the European Court could be
because the United States Constitution does not have a counterpart
to either Article 8 or 12 of the Convention. But, even though the
United States Constitution does not expressly grant the rights of
Articles 8 and 12, those rights have been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in the "right to privacy" cases.
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court began handing down
a series of decisions that created a zone of constitutionally protected
privacy. This zone of privacy was created as a result of the promise
of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 2' The line of cases that started broadly construing
Fourteenth Amendment liberty began with Griswold v. Connecticut,
in which the Court held that married couples and their physicians
were protected from prosecution for using or prescribing
contraceptives. 122 It held that Connecticut's birth control law, which
prevented anyone from using contraceptives, was unconstitutional
because it intruded upon the right of marital privacy.'23 Justice
Douglas reasoned that the freedom of marital association was a
protected privacy right that fell into the penumbra created by the
Fourteenth Amendment and held that the law was unconstitutional
because it operated directly on an intimate relation of husband and
wife. 124 Next, the protected privacy right to use contraceptives
enumerated in Griswold was extended to unmarried couples in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.125 In that case, a Massachusetts law made it a
felony to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons. Justice
Brennan wrote that if the right to privacy were to mean anything,
121. The applicable portion of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution states, "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privilege or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
....." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
123. 381 U.S. at 485-86, 85 S. Ct. at 1682.
124. Id, 85 S. Ct. at 1682.
125. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
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then it must extend to both married and single individuals to make
the decision of whether or not to conceive children, free from the
interference of the government. 2 6 Finally, the Court held that
pregnant women had the right to terminate an early pregnancy
subject to certain qualifications in Roe v. Wade. 2 Justice
Blackmun held that even though the Constitution did not expressly
grant a right of privacy, that right had been recognized in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. But, only
personal rights that were deemed fundamental or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty were included in the guarantee ofprivacy.
Blackmun found that a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy was encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty.12
Only very recently in Lawrence v. Texas has the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's zone of
privacy liberally with respect to sexual minorities. 29 The Court's
pre-Lawrence jurisprudence was anything but favorable to
homosexual Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights. Bowers v.
Hardwick involved a litigant caught by police engaging in
homosexual acts when authorities attempted to serve a traffic
warrant on him at his home.30 The litigant argued that Georgia's
sodomy statute, which made homosexual acts between consenting
men criminal, violated his right to privacy as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court disagreed
and held that the Constitution did not confer a right of privacy that
extended to homosexual sodomy.' 3' In doing so, it overturned the
appellate court's ruling that the law violated the plaintiffs
fundamental rights based on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and on the Ninth Amendment. Justice
White based his decision on the fact that proscriptions against
homosexual conduct had ancient roots and that a homosexual's right
to engage in sodomy was not implicit in the concept of liberty. M2
In June of 2003, the United States Supreme Court handed down
the landmark decision of Lawrence v. Texas. 33 In Lawrence,
Houston police lawfully entered the home of the litigant in response
126. 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at 1038 (emphasis omitted).
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
128. 410 U.S. at 152-53, 93 S. Ct. 726-27.
129. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472. The Court has not addressed transsexual
civil rights yet; however, an analogy can be drawn to the jurisprudence that it has
handed down that has dealt with homosexuals.
130. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841.
131. 478 U.S. at 192, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
132. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
133. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
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to a reported weapons disturbance. They saw him and another adult
male engaged in private, consensual sexual acts. Both men were
arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in sexual intercourse.'34 At their
criminal trial, both men alleged that the statute was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a similar
provision of the Texas Constitution. The Harris County Criminal
Court rejected their contentions and fined them $200 apiece. On
appeal, (and in addition to their prior arguments), the litigants alleged
that the statute was an infringement on their Fourteenth Amendment
privacy rights. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth
District affirmed the criminal court relying upon the holding in
Bowers. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court explicitly
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.'36 In response to the assertion that the
law should be upheld because of the ancient roots of laws proscribing
homosexual sodomy, Justice Kennedy discounted the facts
traditionally used to advance that argument. Although sodomy laws
did indeed have ancient roots, he noted that it was not until the last
third of the 20th century that sodomy laws began to be specifically
targeted against homosexuals. He cited additional evidence that
showed that historically, laws prohibiting sodomy were not really
enforced against consenting adults acting in private. 37  Next,
Kennedy noted that even before Bowers, society's trends and
traditions had changed in favor of an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. He
recognized that the majority of states no longer criminalize private
homosexual conduct. Finally, Kennedy noted that globally, the
Court's position in Bowers had not been followed, as evidenced by
recent European Court of Human Rights decisions. 31
The Court decided that in order to determine the litigant's rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Bowers would have to be
reexamined. It then recounted its prior Fourteenth Amendment right
to privacy jurisprudence, including Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe.
It found that the line of those decisions had consistently been
chipping away at the validity of Bowers such that the rationale of
Bowers no longer withstood careful analysis. 39 The Court drew a
parallel between the facts of Bowers and that of the instant case.
134. Id. at 2476.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2484.
137. Id. at 2479.
138. Id. at 2483.
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
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Kennedy stated that the Court's assertion in Bowers that the
Constitution did not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy disclosed the Court's failure to appreciate the
extent of liberty at stake. He further stated that the issue in Bowers
as well the one before it was not just whether certain individuals had
a certain right to engage in sexual conduct. Instead, what was at stake
were the penalties and purposes of the disputed law and the effect that
those penalties and purposes had upon the most private of human
conduct in the most private of places.' 40 Kennedy looked to the
conduct affected by the Texas statute and found that the law
attempted to control a personal relationship that was within the liberty
of persons to choose. Furthermore, the Court held that the State
could not demean the existence of homosexuals nor control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Finally, the
Court held that the guarantee of liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives homosexuals the full right to engage in private consensual
conduct free from governmental intervention.' 41
The import of Lawrence is United States Supreme Court
recognition of the privacy rights of homosexuals to engage in
consensual sexual conduct. More than that, perhaps, the decision
reveals the Court's emerging awareness of the rights of sexual
minorities in general. Transsexuals may find that an argument for the
right to marry based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and its
expansion through Lawrence to sexual minorities has a chance for
success in the courts.
Sexual minorities should also consider bringing their claims under
the Ninth Amendment, which states that "The enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."' 42 That amendment retains
rights to the people that have not been explicitly or implicitly granted
to the state and federal governments. Advocates of the Bill of Rights
included the Ninth Amendment to prevent any misapplication of the
Constitution as a result of the enumeration of specific rights.
Specifically enumerated federal rights, which are outside the scope of
the Ninth Amendment, may arise due to limitations placed upon the
granted powers. Also, enumerated rights may arise by a specification
of rights, as in Article 1, Section 9, which provides for Congressional
power to create lower courts.'43 Enumerated rights set out in the
amendments include the freedom of speech, religion, press,
140. Id. at 2478.
141. Id. at 2484.
142. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
143. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Rights Retained by
the People 94 (Randy E. Barnett ed., George Mason University Press 1989).
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assemblage, and petition.' Specifically enumerated state rights,
which are outside the scope of the Ninth Amendment, include
freedom from bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws
impairing the obligation of contract. 145
The Ninth Amendment was drafted to negate the inference that
the affirmance of certain rights might disparage others. Instead, the
Ninth Amendment reserves what are known as "natural rights" to the
people. The phrase "natural rights" has many definitions, but one
view is that natural law refers to those rights that grow out of the
nature of man and depend upon personality, as distinguished from
those created by law. 46 A second definition is that natural rights are
those that are innate and come from the very laws of nature, such as
life and liberty. 47 Transsexuals could use the Ninth Amendment as
authority for the argument that the amendment of birth certificates
and the ability to get married are natural rights that they retain.
Support for this view potentially arises from a combination of the
opinions of two United States Supreme Court justices. The first is
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, which
elaborated upon the role of the Ninth Amendment in reinforcing the
development of unenumerated rights in the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The second is from the
dissent articulated by Justice Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, in
which he disagreed with the majority's refusal to consider the Ninth
Amendment as a source of homosexual civil rights.
Justice Goldberg relied upon the Ninth Amendment in his
concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut. He stated that the concept
of liberty embraced the right of marital privacy even though that right
was not explicitly referenced in the constitution. Goldberg concurred
in the majority opinion,'48 but he did not accept the view that due
process incorporated the first eight amendments. Instead, Goldberg
stated that the language and history of the Ninth Amendment
embraced the right of marital privacy. He relied upon the beliefs of
the framers of the Constitution that there were additional fundamental
rights that existed alongside the specifically enumerated rights that
should be protected from governmental infringement. He recognized
that the Ninth Amendment was the work of James Madison, who
drafted the amendment because he was afraid that since some rights
were specifically enumerated in the constitution, those not singled out
would by implication be insecure and assigned into the hands of the
144. U.S. Const. amend. I. Kelsey, supra note 143, at 95.
145. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 cl. 1. Kelsey, supra note 143, at 96.
146. Kelsey, supra note 143, at 97.
147. Id.
148. See infra case presentation in Part IV.B.2.
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government. 49 Further, the inclusion of the Ninth Amendment was
evidence that the first eight amendments did not exhaust all of the
rights guaranteed to the people by the Constitution. Goldberg's view
was that the Ninth Amendment showed the intent of the framers to
protect other fundamental personal rights even though they were not
specifically listed in the first eight constitutional amendments. 50 He
argued that there was no need to resort to the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause when the rights at issue were so inherent to the
people that they were also automatically retained by the people, even
in the absence of an explicit law that so provided.
Similarly, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick'
was based on the Ninth Amendment. Transsexuals could use a
combination of his dissent in Bowers with Goldberg's concurrence in
Griswold to obtain the same civil rights that European transsexuals
enjoy. Blackmun claimed that the real issue in the case concerned the
interest that individuals have in controlling the intimate nature of
their relationships with others, a concern that was at the very heart of
privacy. He began his dissent by noting that Bowers really was not
about the right to engage in homosexual sodomy; rather, it was about
the right most valued by civilized men-the right to be let alone.
Further, he stated that the legislature's moral judgments as expressed
in the sodomy statute should not be determinative of whether the
statute was an unconstitutional restriction on the right of privacy."'
Blackmun reasoned that individuals define themselves in significant
ways through their sexual relationships and that in a nation as diverse
as the United States, there could be many "right" ways of conducting
those relationships. Further, he felt that much of the richness of a
relationship comes from the individual right to choose its form and
nature. Simply put, he stated that the Constitution gives to
individuals the right to choose how to conduct their lives and that
necessarily means that each person will make a different choice.'
Ultimately, he felt that the Georgia legislature could not deny to
individuals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in
particular forms of private, consensual activity because that denial
infringed their right of privacy."'54
But, Blackmun did not limit his dissent to his disagreement with
the Court's treatment of the plaintiffs privacy argument. More
importantly, he may have indirectly invited transsexuals to argue the
149. 381 U.S. at 489-90, 85 S. Ct. at 1684.
150. Id. at 492, 85 S. Ct. at 1686.
151. 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841.
152. Id. at 199, 106 S. Ct. at 2848.
153. Id. at 205, 106 S. Ct. at 2851.
154. Id. at 199, 106 S. Ct. at 2848.
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Ninth Amendment as a source of rights. After the Bowers majority
noted that the sodomy law would not be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, it stated that it would not consider the Ninth
Amendment argument because the plaintiff did not raise it in an
attempt to defend the appellate court's ruling. Blackmun disagreed
with the Court's refusal to consider whether the sodomy statute
violated the Ninth Amendment.' He stated that, even though the
plaintiff had not used the Ninth Amendment as a defense on appeal,
the plaintiff's original petition for relief had invoked the Ninth
Amendment. Blackmun also stressed that the Court was bound to
affirm the appellate court's ruling if there were any basis upon which
the plaintiff was entitled to relief, not just those bases specifically
raised by the plaintiff. He reasoned that, .even though the plaintiff did
not advance claims directly based on the Ninth Amendment, his
complaint still should not have been dismissed if the provision could
have entitled him to relief.5 6
Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold promotes the idea that the
first eight amendments do not represent the only rights guaranteed to
the people; rather, the Ninth Amendment serves as a protection for
fundamental unenumerated rights as well, such as the right of married
couples to use contraception. Blackmun's dissent in Bowers
advocates the idea that the Court should have considered whether or
not the Georgia sodomy law was unconstitutional because it restricted
a fundamental right to engage in private consensual activity retained
by the people under the Ninth Amendment. Now that the issue of
transsexual civil rights is timely due to Goodwin, transsexuals who
wish to argue that laws that restrict their ability to amend their birth
certificates or their ability to get married could claim that they are
suffering a violation of their Ninth Amendment rights. This argument
is especially relevant because there is no explicit or implicit
constitutional grant given to the federal or state governments that
allows them to deny these rights to transsexuals. Blackmun's dissent
seems to have opened the court room doorjust enough to suggest the
possibility that at least one member of a very powerful tribunal would
have been willing to entertain a Ninth Amendment argument in
support of transsexual civil rights.
Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold supports the argument that
the Ninth Amendment serves as a repository of unenumerated rights,
such as the right to legally bring one's actual biological gender into
conformity with one's psychological gender identity on a birth
certificate. Transsexuals could argue that the ability to change the
gender on a birth certificate is a retained right because it deals directly
155. Id. at 201, 106 S. Ct. at 2849.
156. 478 U.S. at 202, 106 S. Ct. at 2849-50.
674 [Vol. 64
with the uniquely personal choice that an individual has to decide
exactly who he is and how he wishes to be known. Further,
Blackmun's dissent in Bowers suggests that the Ninth Amendment
could be used as a basis for the argument that some individually
private activity is constitutionally protected. He believed that the
Constitution guarantees certain rights to all individuals and that each
person should be free to determine how she will live her life.
Transsexuals could argue that they should not be prevented from
having their choice of gender legally recognized; instead, they should
be able to express their fundamental selves by having their identities
accurately reflected on their official birth records as part of their
Ninth Amendment rights.
Once again basing an argument in part on Goldberg's concurrence
in Griswold, transsexuals who litigate in United States courts in
support of civil rights could also argue that the Ninth Amendment
protects the ability to get married as another unenumerated right.
And, citing Blackmun's dissent in Bowers, transsexuals could further
assert that just as spouses of the opposite biological sex such as those
in Griswold and as unmarried couples such as those in Eisenstadt
have the right to be let alone, so does a transsexual couple that desires
to be married. Transsexuals could argue that since all individuals are
different, each individual will necessarily choose to engage in a
different type of relationship. Some transsexuals desire the same
rights as non-transsexuals, an example of which is the desire to find
a partner in life to share in a meaningful relationship. As Blackmun
suggested, intimate relationships are innate to individuals and are not
really subject to state or federal governance. A law that effectively
prohibits the formation of such relationships infringes upon a
transsexual's right to engage in the basic alliances that biologically
opposite sex couples may enjoy. In conclusion, a transsexual could
argue that the ability to get married is grounded in a Ninth
Amendment retained right to form an individual, personal, private
bond. Similarly, transsexuals could assert that the ability to change
their birth-certificate genders comprises the retained right to have
their chosen true identities legally recognized. Thus, neither the right
to change a birth certificate nor the right to get married should be
restricted; rather, those rights are retained under the Ninth
Amendment, and the decision to make them should be left up to the
discretion of the individual.
V. CONCLUSION: BEAUTY IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER...
Goodwin v. United Kingdom was decided by the European Court
of Human Rights in July 2002, and it introduced a reinterpretation of
the legal rights guaranteed to transsexuals by Articles 8 and 12 of the
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Those articles guarantee the right of respect
for private life and the right of marriage, respectively. The European
Court began deciding the extent of transsexual civil rights in cases
such as Rees and Cossey but it did not find violations of Articles 8
and 12. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, however, the European
Court overturned the previous cases and held that Articles 8 and 12
allowed Christine Goodwin the right to change her birth certificate to
reflect her postoperative status and the right to get legally married.
In doing so, it drastically reinterpreted the United Kingdom's
obligations under Articles 8 and 12 and it reversed all of the prior
reasoning that had prevented transsexuals from getting civil rights in
the past.
Goodwin will definitely have an effect on United Kingdom
administrative practices. The United Kingdom must provide ways to
allow for birth registration amendment and marriage between
transsexuals to comply with the Goodwin ruling. Goodwin could
also have an effect on United States courts. Domestic court systems
may experience a rise in sexual minority litigation as a result of the
attention that Goodwin has received. If so, they should consider
becoming morejudicially globalized in their reasoning when deciding
those cases and the civil rights at issue. The European Court of
Human Rights would be an apt teacher in this area of the law because
it is a tribunal dedicated to hearing human rights issues. Further,
some influential United States judges, including United States
Supreme Court justices, seem willing to lend an ear to foreign court
opinions in an effort to learn from the experience and approaches
those courts take in resolving disputes. In the spirit of judicial
comity, domestic court systems should look upon Goodwin as
persuasive authority when dealing with similar cases that arise in the
states.
Finally, Goodwin could also be used by United States transsexuals
seeking the same rights that United Kingdom transsexuals now have.
Goodwin has brought the scope of transsexual civil rights into the
public eye again, so there could be a change in thinking on the issue
lurking on the horizon. The Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision
in Goodridge suggests that transsexuals could seek valid legal
marriages by relying upon state court guarantees of equal protection
in some cases. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Lawrence suggests that transsexuals could use the right to privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment as a justification for the right to
marry. Alternatively, Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold and
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers suggests a third theory for
transsexuals to consider when bringing their claims of rights. The
Ninth Amendment was included in the United States Constitution to
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reserve to the people all rights not explicitly or implicitly granted to
the government. Transsexuals could argue that the right to change
their gender on their birth certificates and the right to get married are
natural rights that are retained by them under the Ninth Amendment.
Transsexuals may be more successful in using a Ninth Amendment
argument to persuade the courts that their natural rights are being
violated by statutes that will not allow them to change their official
gender so as to recognize their true identity or by statutes that deny to
them the ability to engage in the fundamental act of marriage.
Unlike their international brethren, domestic courts have been
unwilling to extend civil rights recognition to transsexuals. Goodwin
may usher in a new era of change, for the ugly duckling has been
made a beautiful swan in Europe. Will United States courts continue
to see an ugly duckling or a newly emerged swan? The answer to that
depends upon whether domestic courts are ready to judicially
recognize the beauty of laws that equally protect and indiscriminately
apply to all individuals, regardless of their facade.
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